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[TRU/FALS]ISMS: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SEVERAL
ARKANSAS JUDICIAL ELECTION BROMIDES
Honorable Timothy Davis Fox*
Abstract
Which one of the following statements, if any, is most probably true
and correct in contested Arkansas trial court elections?
a) The cost of judicial elections is "skyrocketing";
b)Attorneys provide most of the contributions for judicial campaigns;
c) The incumbent enjoys a 5% to 10% edge;
d)Attorneys can't get judges elected but they can get them defeated;
e) The candidate raising the most money wins judicial elections; or
f) Hot glass looks like cold glass.
If you already know the answer, you had better run along because you
are probably late for your Mensa meeting. If you are mildly curious but tight
on time, skip to the conclusion. But if you have a few minutes, I think you
will find both the substance and form of the information in this article inter-
esting and easily digestible.
I. INTRODUCTION
We have all heard and repeated at least some of "them." All of us.
Well, maybe not those of our brethren who attempt to hide their chronologi-
cal infirmity by referring to themselves as the "Young Lawyers Section."
You know who "they" are. They are the ones who think it is helpful to tell
the venire panel that it is their first jury trial. A statement inevitably fol-
lowed by a moment of uncomfortable lachrymosity. But enough of "they,"
this article focuses on "them." "Them" is the individual precepts of conven-
tional wisdom concerning the election of judges in Arkansas. The principal
focus of this article is to ascertain whether statistical information compiled
from Arkansas judicial candidates' financial information supports such
anecdotal statements.
* After practicing law for over twenty years, the author was elected, in 2002, as Circuit
Judge, Sixth Division, Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of Arkansas. Judge Fox is the first
Arkansas jurist to earn a Master of Judicial Studies degree.
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The tested statements have been placed into the most concise method
of discovering the truth known to the modem world: a multistate bar exami-
nation multiple choice question. The question is:
Which of the following statements, if any, is most probably true and
correct in contested Arkansas trial court elections?
a) The cost of judicial elections is "skyrocketing";
b)Attorneys provide the majority of contributions to judicial cam-
paigns;
c) The incumbent enjoys a 5% to 10% edge;
d) Attorneys can't get judges elected but they can get them defeated;
e) The candidate raising the most money always wins judicial elections;
or
f) Hot glass looks like cold glass.
The only comprehensive analyses to date concerning Arkansas judicial
election financial information were written in 1989 and 1992. Since such
articles were published, the voters of Arkansas approved Amendment 80 to
the Arkansas Constitution,2 effecting material changes to the Arkansas judi-
cial branch of government. Arkansas has now completed three full judicial
election cycles since the passage of Amendment 80 and is in the early stages
of the fourth post-Amendment 80 election process. Although there have
been a number of articles written concerning Amendment 80's merger of
law and equity,3 there has been no written assessment of the effects that
Amendment 80 may have occasioned upon the financial mechanics of judi-
cial elections in the State of Arkansas.
This article has three purposes. First, it seeks to statistically quantify
and interpret amounts and sources of campaign contributions in contested
Arkansas trial court contests for the 1996 through 2006 elections. Second, it
addresses whether the compiled data supports or refutes the possible an-
swers to the multiple-choice question concerning judicial election "conven-
tional wisdom." And finally, it seeks to ascertain whether the compiled sta-
tistics evidence any change in Arkansas judicial financing that may be attri-
butable to the implementation of Amendment 80.
1. James D. Gingerich, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections, 23 ARK. LAW. 66
(Apr. 1989) [hereinafter "Gingerich 1989"]; James D. Gingerich & Warren Readnour, The
1990 Arkansas Judicial Elections: Much Ado About Nothing?, 23 ARK. LAW. 37 (July 1992)
[hereinafter "Gingerich & Readnour 1992"].
2. Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution appeared on the 2000 general election
ballot as "Referred Amendment 3." Publisher's Notes, ARK. CONST. amend. 80.
3. See, e.g., John J. Watkins, The Right to Trial by Jury in Arkansas After the Merger
of Law and Equity, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 649 (2002); Larry Brady & J.D. Ginge-




II. RELEVANT SECTIONS OF AMENDMENT 80 AND IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION
The study period included in this article contains judicial election
cycles from 1996 through 2006. Three of the elections, 1996, 1998, and
2000, were pre-Amendment 80, and the remaining three elections were post-
Amendment 80. Prior to the passage of Amendment 80, judges in Arkansas
were elected on a partisan basis in the same manner and same election
framework as elected officers from the other two branches of government.4
There were three types of trial judges: chancery judges, circuit judges, and
circuit/chancery judges.5 Chancery judges had six-year terms, 6 circuit
judges' terms were four years,7 and circuit/chancery judges were elected to
four-year terms.8 Amendment 80 removed the differences in title and subject
matter jurisdiction.9 All of the former categories of state court trial judges
are now circuit judges exercising general jurisdiction, and all have six-year
terms.'l The effect, if any, that the lengthening of the circuit judges' terms of
office may have had on judicial campaign finances is outside the scope of
this article.
Section 17(A) of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provides
that "Circuit Judges and District Judges shall be elected on a nonpartisan
basis by a majority of qualified electors voting for such office within the
circuit or district which they serve." To implement section 17(A), the Ar-
kansas General Assembly enacted Act 1789 of 2001, codified as Arkansas
Code section 7-10-102." Section 7-10-102(b)(1) sets the general elections
for nonpartisan judicial elections on "the same dates and at the same times
and places as provided by law for preferential primary elections." In the
event that a nonpartisan judicial candidate fails to receive a majority of the
votes, the nonpartisan judicial runoff election is held "on the same date and
at the same times and places as the November general election."' 2
Although there were a number of legitimate reasons for establishing the
nonpartisan judicial election schedule, not the least of which was minimiz-
ing cost to taxpayers, the nonpartisan election sequencing presents several
4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-10-102 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
5. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. VII, § 11; ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. VII, § 15, 1977 Ark.
Acts 432.
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-309 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
7. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. VII, §17.
8. 1977 Ark. Acts 432.
9. ARK. CONST. amend. 80.
10. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 16(B).
11. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-10-102 (LEXIS Repl. 2007).
12. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-10-102(c)(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2007).
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interesting election dynamics. 3 With respect to its potential impact on cam-
paign contributions, the most important difference is the inversion of the
relationship between general elections and runoffs. General elections custo-
marily draw a much larger voter turnout than runoff elections. This is no
longer the case in Arkansas judicial elections. The nonpartisan judicial gen-
eral election turnouts on the May party primary date are significantly lower
than the nonpartisan judicial runoff turnout on the November general elec-
tion date. 4 Additionally, runoffs typically occur within several weeks of the
general election. Judicial runoff elections in Arkansas are now conducted
approximately six months following the nonpartisan general election.15
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Candidates for elective office, including judicial office, are subject to
the requirements of the Arkansas Campaign Practices Act.16 The campaign
finance reporting requirements applicable to judicial candidates are set forth
in Arkansas Code section 7-6-207. The minimum monetary threshold for
contributions and expenditures that invokes the reporting requirements of
Arkansas Code section 7-6-207 is $500.17 If a candidate collects or spends
less than that amount, there is no reporting requirement other than a final
report. 8 The reporting requirements once the $500 minimum is satisfied are
as follows:
(a) a quarterly report for each quarter in a calendar year in which the
candidate is not listed on a ballot;19
(b) beginning with the month of January in the calendar year in which
the candidate's name will be on the ballot, a monthly report is required;2"
13. First, based upon numerous comments made to me as well as information obtained
anecdotally from other judges, many voters still expect that their vote (or in any event their
"final" vote) for a judicial position will be during the November election. Second, the elec-
tion at which voters are now asked to select nonpartisan judicial officers or judicial runoff
candidates is the election day that was formerly the province exclusively of the political
parties.
14. Prior to Amendment 80, voter turnout for the general election was approximately
four times that of judicial runoff elections. After Amendment 80 the runoff turnout has been
about two and a half to three times that of the general election. The average voter participa-
tion figures for the 1996 through 2006 judicial races are as follows:
1 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
General Election 22,606 17,516 21,992 9082 4480 6806
Runoff 4088 n/a 3898 24,584 17,181 31,467
15. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-10-102(c)(2) (2007).
16. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-101, etseq. (LEXIS Repl. 2007).
17. Id. § 7-6-207(c)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2007).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 7-6-207(a)(l)(A).
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(c) in any month in which part of the month is included in a required
pre-election report or a final report, no monthly report is due for that
month;21
(d) pre-election reports are required for the period between the last
filed report and ten days before the election;22 and
(e) a final election report for each election, general or runoff."
The statistics in this article concerning candidate contributions were
obtained from the finance reports filed with the Arkansas Secretary of State.
The data concerning winning, losing, election contest margins, and numbers
of votes were gathered from the election results as certified to the Arkansas
Secretary of State. All of the source documents used in conducting this
study are available on-line in very user-friendly formats.24 Sorting the in-
formation, however, from the financial reports was more difficult than orig-
inally expected. Whether because of an abundance of caution or ignorance
of the statutory requirements, duplicate reports and reports containing dup-
licative information are not uncommon in the judicial filings. As an exam-
ple, there was one instance in which the exact same report was filed four
times on four different days.25 Additionally, the forms provided by the Sec-
retary of State's office changed several times during the 1996 through 2006
period. In one version of the forms, the reporting area for cumulative infor-
mation was at the bottom of the first page of the report, and in another ver-
sion the cumulative total was to the right of the reporting period contribution
and expenditure boxes. Some candidates kept running totals, some failed to
maintain running totals for the first few months, and some never kept run-
ning totals. In races involving more than one election, some candidates ter-
minated their cumulative totals after the initial election and began anew for
the second election, whereas others elected to subtotal after the first election
but maintained a single running total for the entire election cycle.
After devoting many hours to various arcane forms of numerical sleu-
thery, the approach that most consistently eliminated duplication was to
identify the initial report for each candidate, mark the ending campaign bal-
ance as listed on the initial report, and then review the starting and ending
campaign balance numbers listed on every subsequent report for that candi-
20. Id. § 7-6-207(a)(1)(B).
21. Id. § 7-6-207(a)(1)(B).
22. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-207(a)(1)(C) (2007).
23. Id. § 7-6-207(a)(l)(D) (2007).
24. The candidate campaign report filings and candidate financial information filings
may be accessed on-line at www.sos.arkansas.gov/elections/ce/index.php. Election results are
available at www.sos.arkansas.gov/electionselectionresults.htm.
25. It is not the purpose of this article to embarrass anyone attempting to comply with
the reporting requirements. The information given concerning multiple filings and candidate
accounting methodologies is provided merely to advise that exact numbers concerning judi-
cial candidates are often difficult to calculate.
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date, regardless of the report file date, to synchronize the numbers. Using
this method, the reports, regardless of when filed, could be daisy-chained
into a seamless whole. Over a thousand financial report filings were re-
viewed using this methodology.
Arkansas Code section 7-6-207(b)(1)(B) requires for every contribu-
tion over $50 a listing of the name, address, place of business, employer,
and occupation of the contributor. Some candidates scrupulously adhere to
the requirements of this section, while others take a more Barbossa-esque
view. 26 The information required by Arkansas Code section 7-6-
207(b)(1)(B) is important to this study in two principal areas: candidate
campaign contributions and attorney campaign contributions. The submis-
sion of section 207 (b)(1)(B) information in the candidate reports is less
consistent than the information concerning total campaign contributions.
In an effort to insure the reliability of the candidate campaign contribu-
tion information, all of the reports and all sections of the reports for each
candidate were cross-checked. Some candidates include candidate loans in
contribution totals, while others do not. Some candidates treat any moneys
given to their campaigns as loans, some do not call them loans but list them
instead as contributions, and other candidates report their financial participa-
tion as a mixture of both loans and contributions. Some candidates do not
reference any loans, but only show a substantial negative balance on their
final campaign report. In some reporting situations, reduction of candidate
advances to their campaigns occurs during the interim filings, and in other
cases the only reductions for candidate loans are evidenced on the final re-
port. Loans are sometimes listed as being from the spouse of the candidate.
For this study, if a report clearly identifies the person loaning money as the
candidate or the spouse of the candidate, then such monies are treated as
candidate contributions. It is not uncommon for a final report to contain a
discrepancy between total contributions and total expenditures. If a candi-
date's final report contains an unexplained material discrepancy between
contributions and expenditures, then the negative discrepancy is allocated
for this study as a candidate contribution. The same rationale is used in the
event that a final report has a material campaign surplus, in that any out-
standing candidate loan is deemed reduced by the amount of the surplus.
Finally, in those instances in which a final report shows an unexplained sub-
stantial negative balance for the campaign, the amount of the negative bal-
ance is treated as a candidate contribution.
Compliance with the requirement of listing contributors' occupations
occurs in fewer reports than provision of candidate loan information. No
extrapolation has been made for this study based upon the author's personal
26. "(T]he Code is more what you'd call 'guidelines' than actual rules." Captain Hector
Barbossa, PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Disney 2003).
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knowledge of whether a contributor was an attorney. If a candidate's report
series consistently identifies contributor occupations, then such candidate's
information is included in this study with respect to the attorney contribution
statistics. If the contributor information is nonexistent or only partially
available, then the attorney contribution category for that candidate is listed
as "incomplete" for this study.
Using the parameters enumerated above, statistical information was
developed from the financial reports and election information concerning
140 candidates in contested trial judge elections; sixty-five of the candidates
are pre-Amendment 80, and the remaining seventy-five are post-
Amendment 80 candidates.27 With the exception of one candidate,28 some
viable contribution information is available for all of the candidates. The
reported information is sufficiently complete concerning attorney contribu-
tions for 132 of the 140 candidates in the study.
The 140 trial court candidates engaged in sixty separate races; twenty-
eight are pre-Amendment 80 contests, and the remaining thirty-two are post-
Amendment 80. Of the sixty races, forty-eight are classified for this article
as "one-election" or "non-runoff" races. "One-election" or "non-runoff'
races, regardless of whether pre or post-Amendment 80, are races in which
there are only two candidates and only one judicial election was necessary
to determine the winner. The remaining twelve races, again regardless of
whether pre or post-Amendment 80, involved three or more candidates, and
at least two elections were required to determine the winner. Incumbents
were challenged in nineteen of the sixty contested races. Table I lists the
circuit, election year, and Amendment 80 relationship of the contested races
included in this study.
TABLE I
Contested Races B Circuit and Election
Cir. 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Total Before/After 80
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 3/2
2 0 0 1 3 0 1 5 1/4
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0/1
4 1 2 2 0 0 0 5 5/0
5 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 1/1
6 2 2 1 4 0 0 9 5/4
7N 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1/0
7S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/0
8N 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0/1
8S 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0/1
9E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/0
27. An Appendix listing the election year, name, circuit, and division for each of the 140
candidates can be found at the conclusion of this article.
28. Sam Whitfield, Jr., candidate for the First Circuit in 1996.
2008]
UALR LAW REVIEW
9W 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1/0
10 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 1/2
11 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0/1
11 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 0/3
12 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 3/0
13 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1/0
14 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0/2
15 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0/1
16 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0/2
17 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0/1
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/0
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1/0
18 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0/1
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/0
19 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1/0
19 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1/1
20 2 0 0 3 0 0 5 2/3
21 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 1/1
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/0
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/0
To- 12 12 6 24 3 5 60 28/32
The information obtained from the data sources was assessed from a
number of perspectives. Averages were obtained for the categories of total
campaign contributions, candidate campaign contributions, and attorney
campaign contributions. The mean was determined for all candidates and
then separately for candidates in one-election or non-runoff races and for
candidates in multi-election contests. The total, candidate, and attorney
campaign contribution categories were then divided into pre- and post-
Amendment 80 subcategories and the same averaging computations were
performed. The results of these calculations were then charted to determine
if any trends could be determined for the entire ten-year study period, for
one-election races compared to two election races, and for any post-
Amendment election contribution trends suggestive of differences attributa-
ble to Amendment 80. Finally, winning and losing percentages were com-
puted for each of the three contribution categories as well as the pre- and
post-Amendment chronological subcategories.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA
The information concerning each of the three contribution categories-
total contributions, candidate contributions, and attorney contributions-is
addressed separately, and then a comparison of the three categories is made.
For each of the three contribution categories, the dollar amounts for the ten-
year study period are reviewed. This review is then followed by a percen-
[Vol. 30
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tage analysis concerning winning or losing, again to see if there are any ob-
servable trends.
Prior to beginning any type of statistical comparison, comment must be
made concerning a 2006 Second Circuit race. The total contributions and
candidate contributions in the 2006 Second Circuit, Division 7 race are so
far in excess of any other trial court contest that the race single-handedly
skews the results of any attempt to ascertain patterns or trends concerning
judicial campaigns. The magnitude of its deviation from the norm is ampli-
fied in that it is the only 2006 runoff contest.
The candidates in the subject Second Circuit race were Barbara Halsey,
Ray Spruell, and Alan Seagrave. Halsey and Spruell made it to the runoff,
with Halsey ultimately elected. The total campaign contributions, candidate
contributions, and contributions from attorneys are listed in Table II.
TABLE II
2006 Second Circuit Race
Total, Candidate, and Attorney Contributions
Total Candidate Attoreys
Halsey $401,744 $310,438 $10,850
Spruell $168,858 $132,454 $3,250
Seagrave $52,453 $42 436 $1200
Total $623,145 $485,328 $15,300
Average $207,715 $161,776 $5,100
Although there have been several Arkansas Supreme Court races in-
volving comparable sums of money, 29 the 2006 Second Circuit race is clear-
ly anomalous in Arkansas trial court contests. As an illustration, the average
total contribution in the Second Circuit race is over 300% higher than the
2006 one-election total contribution average,30 and the Second Circuit can-
didate average is more than 1600% greater than the one-election candidate
contribution average.3' It is very interesting, however, that the Second Cir-
cuit attorney contribution average of $5100 is almost exactly the same as the
2006 one-election attorney contribution average.32
29. The 1990 race between Robert Brown and Judith Rogers had aggregate contributions
of approximately $700,000, and the 2004 race between Jim Gunter, Collins Kilgore, and Paul
Danielson had contributions totaling about $720,000.
30. The 2006 one-election total contribution average was $50,229.45; the 2006 runoff
average was $207,715.
31. The 2006 one-election candidate contribution average was $9,394.31; the 2006
runoff average was $161,776.






Distribution of the sixty contested trial judge races varies widely be-
tween the 1996 through 2006 election period,33 with 2002 presenting the
most contests.34 When the ten year study period is reviewed as a whole, it is
clear from the data that total contributions in the one-election race subset are
steadily increasing. 35 For the purpose of comparison with candidate contri-
butions and attorney contributions, the averaged one-election total campaign
contributions are expressed in Chart 1.
CHART 1
Mean - Total Campaign Contributions








1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
-- Total Contributions
As previously stated, only twelve of the sixty elections in the survey
are multi-election contests. Post-Amendment 80, these contests involve a
general election followed by a runoff election. Pre-Amendment 80, these
elections normally included a party primary followed by a general election.
Almost 50% of the multi-election contests occurred in 2002.36 Because of
the limited number of the multi-election races, no separate trending conclu-
sions were developed for those races. The information from those races,
33. 1996: nine one-election races, three runoff races; 1998: eleven one-election races,
zero runoff races; 2000: four one-election races, two runoff races; 2002: nineteen one-
election races, five runoff races; 2004: one one-election race, one runoff race; and 2006: four
one-election races, one runoff race.
34. Id.
35. The average for one-election races is as follows: 1996: $20,369.46; 1998:
$33,424.90; 2000: $21,338.80; 2002: $41,061.08; 2004: $38,827.11; and 2006: $50,229.45.
36. Five of the twelve runoff races were 2002 contests. The remaining seven were as
follows: 1996: three; 1998: zero; 2000: two; 2004: one; and 2006: one.
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however, helped to create comparisons between the subset of one-election
races and the universe of sixty contests.
It is clear that more than one election causes significant additional ex-
pense in judicial contests.37 The effect that runoff races have on the total
contribution averages is dramatic, as evidenced by Chart 2.38
CHART 2
Mean - Total Campaign Contributions









$20,000 - "-_____-'"__ -  f
$10,000
$0
1996 1998* 2000 2002 2004 2006
- Total All Elections ---- Total One Election
The averaging results evidence a general upward trend in total contri-
butions for trial court candidates. The $20,000 one-election average in 1996
rose to a 2006 one-election average of $50,000, a 150% increase over the
ten year study period. To cross-check the averaging results, the total contri-
butions also were reviewed on an individual candidate basis by rankings
using increments of $5000. The ranks begin at $5000 or less and continue in
$5000 increments until the final rank, total contributions of more than
$100,000. All of the candidate information, for both one-election and multi-
election contests, is included in the ranked profile. As with the averaging
37. In 1996, the all election average was $26,776.15, compared with the $20,369.46
one-election average. In 1998, there were no runoff elections, so the average is the same. In
2000, the all election average was $34,590.88, compared with the $21,338.80 one-election
average. In 2002, the all election average was $47,002.20, compared with the $41,061.08
one-election average. In 2004, the all election average was $46,691.79, compared with the
$38,827.11 one-election average. Finally, in 2006, the all election average was $93,155.27,
compared with the $50,229.45 one-election average.
38. 1998 is asterisked because all of the 1998 elections are one-election contests.
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methodology, this type of computation also clearly indicates an upward
trend. In 1996, 84% of the candidates reported total contributions of $40,000
or less, with only 8% of the candidates having total contributions in excess
of $60,000. By the 2006 election, however, the less than $40,000 total con-
tribution percentage plummeted to 36% and candidates reporting more than
$60,000 in total contributions rose to 46% of the total candidate population.
The magnitude of the shift in ranks is shown in Chart 3.
CHART 3
Difference Between 1996 & 2006 Total Contributions
1996 Total Contributions 2006 Total Contributions
! 40K-
60K
Overall, the report filings reflect a substantial but relatively steady in-
crease in total contributions in one-election races for trial court judicial can-
didates. There is also some evidence to support a conclusion that total con-
tributions in runoff elections may be increasing at a much greater rate than
in one-election contests. The next inquiry is to determine if the total contri-
bution data discloses any pattern concerning which candidates win and
which candidates lose.
2. Winning/Losing Percentages
The ranking system assists in determining if there is a winning or los-
ing pattern relative to total campaign contributions. For each of the sixty
study races, an initial determination was made concerning which candidate
received the most in total contributions and whether the "most money" can-
didate won or lost the contest. The difference in total contributions between
the "most money" candidate and his/her opponent then was calculated.
[Vol. 30
JUDICIAL ELECTION BROMIDES
These results were ranked, again utilizing $5000 increments, with the top
rank being a contribution differential in excess of $35,000. Table III con-





0- 5K- 10K- 15K- 20K- 25K- 30K- >35K
5K 10K 5K 20K 25K 30K 35K
Win 5 2 5 4 5 3 2 8
Lose 4 4 0 2 2 0 1 1
Total 9 6 5 6 7 3 3 9
Overall, the "most money" candidate wins approximately 73% of the
time. The "most money" winning percentage increases to 90% when the
total contribution differential exceeds $35,000. The percentage results are
visually represented in Chart 4.
CHART 4
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All but twenty of the 140 judicial candidates included in the study re-
ported some amount of candidate campaign contributions. 9 With the excep-
tion of the 2006 election cycle, the average amount of candidate contribu-
tions in the one-election contests increased during the ten-year study pe-
















1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
- Candidate
Whether the 2006 one-election candidate contribution downturn is an
aberration or the beginning of a new pattern will be determined by future
elections. The lower 2006 candidate average appears to be an isolated event
when the one-election candidate contribution averages are compared to the
candidate contribution averages for all of the elections. It is apparent from
the numbers in Chart 6 that the total candidate contribution amounts appear
to be continuing in an upward mode.
39. The following candidates reported no candidate contributions: in 1996: Yeargan
(Circuit 9W), Anthony (Circuit 13), Smith (Circuit 6), Kilgore (Circuit 6); in 1998: Baker
(Circuit 21), Fitzhugh (Circuit 12), Bogard (Circuit 6); in 2000: Lindsay (Circuit 4), Thome
(Circuit 2), Halbert (Circuit 1); in 2002: Jenkins (Circuit 1 1E), Henry (Circuit 1 E), Johnson
(Circuit 8S), Hart (Circuit 8S), Moore (Circuit 6), Cazort (Circuit 6), Fox (Circuit 6), Smith
(Circuit 3); and in 2006: Wright (Circuit 1). Additionally, the reporting information in 1996
was incomplete for Whitfield, Circuit 1, Division 1.
40. 1996: $5,740.98; 1998: $12,698.15; 2000: $12,134.65; 2002: $18,342.00; 2004:











Mean - Candidate Contributions
One-Election Race Subset Compared To All
Elections
1996 1998* 2000 2002 2004 2006
-0 Candidate All Elections - Candidate One-Election
2. Winning/Losing Percentages
There were two one-election races in which neither candidate used any
personal funds. 4' The win/loss results of the "most money" candidate are





0- 5K- 10K- 15K- 20K- 25K- 30K- >35K
5K 10K 15K 20K 25K 30K 35K
Win 5 7 1 3 1 1 2 2
Lose 12 1 4 3 1 1 1 0
Total 17 8 5 6 2 2 3 2
The winning percentages for the candidate contribution differential re-
sults for the "most money" are graphically represented in Chart 7. The over-
all win percentage for the "most money" candidates is a skosh shy of 50%.

















The average attorney contribution for one-election races ranges from
approximately $300042 to almost $7000.43 Attorney contributions is the only
category in the study that shows no clear pattern of growth. As a percentage
of the average total contribution, the attorney contribution component of
one-election cases has been decreasing." The average attorney contributions
for each election cycle expressed in dollar amounts are graphed in Chart 8.
42. 1996.
43. 2002.















Mean, Attorney Campaign Contributions
One-El ectio n Races
I
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
1 Attorney Contributions
2. Winning/Losing Percentages
Approximately 50% of the one-election contests have attorney contri-
bution differentials of less than $5000. 45 The differential ranking spread for
attorney contributions is different than that of total or candidate contribu-






0- 5K - 10K- 15K- 20K- 25K- 30K- >35K
5K 10K 15K 20K 25K 30K 35K
Win 16 12 1 2 1 0 1 2
Lose 8 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total 24 13 2 2 1 0 1 2
45. This statistic is based on seventeen of the forty-five one-election contests for which
comparative information was available.
46. The number of races having an attorney contribution differential of $5000 or less is
substantially higher than that found in total contributions or candidate contributions. The total
contribution differential increment of $5000 or less occurs in only about 19% of the races.




As a whole, the "most money" attorney contribution group has a win-
ning percentage of 67%. The winning percentage jumps to 90% if the "most
money" candidate's attorney contribution is more than $5,000 that of his or
her opponent. The results of all of the $5,000 incremental rankings are
represented by Chart 9.
CHART 9
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D. Total Candidate & Attorney Contributions
1. Averaging Results
Placing the chart information concerning total, candidate, and attorney
contributions together in a single graph creates a very interesting visual. If
the averages are divided into one-election and multi-election contests, sev-
eral patterns further emerge. Chart 10 shows the one-election averages, and
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CHART 11
Mean - Total, Candidate and Attorney
Contributions








1996 1998* 2000 2002 2004 2006
Total All Elections - Candidate All Elections
Attorneys All Elections -4- Total One Election
- Candidate One Election -0- Attorneys One Election
Chart 10 plainly shows that judicial candidates foot a much larger por-
tion of total contributions than do attorneys. Chart 11 reveals three patterns:
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(i) the cost of multi-election races is growing at a higher rate than one-
election races; (ii) judicial candidates self-finance a much larger portion of
multi-election races when compared to one-election races and provide an
even higher proportion of total contributions in multi-election races than in
one-election races; and (iii) attorneys' financial participation does not
change regardless of whether the contest is one-election or multi-election.
2. Winning/Losing Percentages
Perhaps the most striking comparison of the contribution data is found
by comparing the winning percentage of the "most money" candidates in the
total, candidate, and attorney contribution categories using the incremental
contribution differential. These percentages are set forth in Chart 12.
CHART 12
Winning Percentage Relative To Total, Candidate
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-Total - Candidate - Attorneys
It is apparent from the contribution differential analysis that attorney
contribution dollars in contested trial court elections in Arkansas carry an
election day intangible. The attorney contribution winning percentage is not
only materially higher than the candidate contribution percentage, but it is
also higher than the total contribution winning percentage. The nature of the
nonmonetary attorney contribution effect cannot be discerned from the fi-
nancial information contained in the candidate filings. It is clearly an impor-
tant factor, however, in conducting a winning trial court campaign.
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E. Contested Races Involving Incumbents
Approximately one-third of the sixty contests in the study involve in-
cumbents.4 7 Twelve of the incumbent races are prior to Amendment 80 and
seven are after Amendment 80. Only two incumbents were defeated during
the 1996 through 2006 election cycles,4" an 89% success rate. The total con-
tribution and attorney contribution averages are what could reasonably be
anticipated with the incumbents enjoying a monetary advantage in both cat-
egories. 49 The unexpected statistic is that incumbents contribute more on the
average to their reelection campaigns than do the challengers to their efforts
to unseat the incumbents.50
CHART 13
Mean - Total, Candidate and Attorney
Contributions
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U Incumbent U Challenger
The information provided in the candidate filings is of no assistance in
determining the validity of the proposition that attorneys can get judges de-
feated. In sixteen of the nineteen incumbent races, attorneys provided more
47. Incumbents were challenged in nineteen races: twelve prior to the passage of
Amendment 80 and seven subsequent to its passage. The nineteen incumbents were: 2004:
Simes; 2002: Kinney, Smith, Gibson, Harkey, Reynolds, and Collier; 2000: Simes; 1998:
Kinney, Williams, Bogard, Mazzanti, and Langston; and 1996: Butt, Smith, Kilgore, Antho-
ny, Williams, and Huffman.
48. Langston and Williams, both in 1998.
49. Incumbent total contribution average is $40,749.96, compared to challenger average
of $27,768.85. The incumbent attorney contribution average is $8,747.22, as opposed to the
challenger average of $1,031.24.




support to the winning incumbent than to the challenger. These sixteen races
are of no assistance with respect to the "defeating judges" issue. In the three
remaining races involving incumbents, attorneys provided greater monetary
support to the losing candidate. Of the losing candidates, one was a challen-
ger and two were incumbents. These cases are also of no assistance in test-
ing the "defeating judges" proposition. Actually, with attorneys backing the
winner in sixteen out of nineteen races, the information provides evidence
that disproves the proposition that attorneys "can't get judges elected."
The seventeen incumbents that won reelection bids received an average
of 62.7% of their contest votes. If the two losing incumbent races are fac-
tored in, the average is reduced to 60.7%. The seven post-Amendment 80
incumbent races saw the incumbents receive an average of 61.9%, while the
ten pre-Amendment 80 winning incumbents received an average of 64.2%.
By comparison, the winners in the one-election open seat races posted an
average of 57.4% of the contest votes, without any material difference in the
vote spread pre-Amendment 80 versus post-Amendment 80. The average
percentage vote spread between winning incumbents and the winners of
one-election open seats is 5.3%.
V. COMPARISON TO 1989 AND 1992 ARKANSAS JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN
STUDIES
There are two prior studies concerning Arkansas judicial candidates
useful for comparison purposes with the present study.5' The Gingerich
1989 study analyzed all judicial candidates' financial reports for the 1976
through 1988 election cycles.52 Gingerich described the purpose of the 1989
article as an effort to respond to deficiencies in the availability of empirical
data concerning judicial elections and "to define more clearly the state of
money in judicial elections in Arkansas."53 Gingerich 1989 took the data
accumulated from the Arkansas judicial candidates' reports to test the va-
lidity of four conclusions in Arkansas reached by previous judicial cam-
paign studies from other jurisdictions.54 The four conclusions tested were:
(1) that costs of judicial campaigns are "skyrocketing;" (2) that campaign
fundraising is a barrier to office-seeking; (3) that too much money is contri-
buted by lawyers; and (4) that judicial elections can be bought by the candi-
date with the most money.55 Much of the statistical information in Gingerich
1989 concerned areas of inquiry outside the scope of the present study. Be-
cause the present study analyzes contested trial court campaigns, the Ginge-
51. Gingerich 1989, supra note 1; Gingerich & Readnour 1992, supra note 1.






rich 1989 results were sifted to exclude statistical information concerning
uncontested trial court races and all information concerning appellate judi-
cial contests and candidates.
Gingerich & Readnour 1992 is substantially more limited in scope than
Gingerich 1989. Gingerich & Readnour 1992's stated purpose was to ana-
lyze the 1990 judicial elections to determine whether the costs of judicial
elections were increasing and whether lawyers were being required to pro-
vide a greater percentage of campaign funds for judicial candidates.56 As
with Gingerich 1989, the 1992 study contains information concerning both
trial and appellate court judicial candidates.
A. Gingerich 1989
Gingerich 1989 provides useful comparison data for all of the cam-
paign categories analyzed in the present study. Starting with the threshold
inquiry of total campaign contributions, Gingerich 1989 determined that the
range of expenditures of all contested judicial races from 1976 through 1988
was $13,759 in 1978 to $36,725 in 1980.57 It also concluded that the average
cost of a contested trial court judicial campaign for the 1976 through 1988
election cycles was $11,927.58 The 1989 study further determined that trial
court candidates' contributions accounted for 38% of total contributions59
and attorney contributions, in contested trial court races, averaged 9% of
contributions.60
Gingerich 1989 labels the candidate raising and spending the most
money as "the big spender."'', There is no comparison in the 1989 study
about how much money the opponent of the "big spender" candidate raised
or any effect on the "big spender" success rate depending upon the size of
the monetary spread between the "big money" candidate and his or her op-
ponent. Gingerich 1989 found that the trial court candidate spending the
most money won in 64% of the races.
62
The 1989 study also contains information concerning incumbents. For
the 1976 through 1988 elections, Gingerich 1989 determined that trial court
incumbents won 94% of the time.63 In its information concerning incum-
bents, Gingerich 1989 did not discriminate between contested races and
56. Gingerich & Readnour 1992, supra note 1, at 37.
57. Gingerich 1989, supra note 1, at 71.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 70.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 72.
62. Id.
63. Gingerich 1989, supra note 1, at 69.
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uncontested races, so the 94% incumbent statistic presumably includes both
types of races.
The conclusions of Gingerich 1989 refute the applicability of the gen-
eral national study conclusions for the 1976 through 1988 Arkansas judicial
elections. Gingerich 1989 concluded that there was no general trend of in-
creasing campaign costs during the 1976 through 1988 Arkansas judicial
election cycles.' 4 It also concluded that there was no discernible trend appar-
ent in percentage of attorney contributions65 and that any assertion that law-
yers contribute most of the funding for judicial campaigns could not be
substantiated.66
B. Gingerich & Readnour 1992
Gingerich & Readnour 1992 is a snapshot study of the 1990 judicial
election cycle. The 1992 study determined the average total contributions
for 1990 trial court candidates, contested as well as uncontested, was
$17,263.67 It further found that in all contested races in 1990, in both the
appellate and trial courts, candidate contributions comprised approximately
38%6" of contributions and attorneys contributed approximately 9.2% of the
campaign monies.69 In trial court campaigns, the candidate spending the
most money won only 65% of the time.7° The 1992 study determined that
93% of incumbent trial judges were reelected.7
Gingerich & Readnour 1992 concluded, as did Gingerich 1989, that
Arkansas judicial election statistics for the 1990 election did not support the
conclusions that costs of judicial campaigns are "skyrocketing" or that law-
yers are being "bankrupted by demands for contributions. 72
VI. CONCLUSION
Amendment 80 does not appear to have had any material effect on
campaign contributions, at least in one-election contests. Total contributions
were trending upward prior to Amendment 80 and continue in that trend.
Attorney contributions have not materially changed. The numbers do indi-
cate that total contributions and candidate contributions in runoff races may
64. Id. at 71.
65. Id. at 70.
66. Id. at 72.
67. Gingerich & Readnour 1992, supra note 1, at 38.
68. Id. at 39.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 40.




be increasing at a far greater rate than one-election contests. Additional
study would be required to determine if that was a function of the general
increase in total contributions or whether the additional increase was attri-
butable, at least in part, to the Amendment 80 election configuration.
There is substantially less voter participation in the selection of judicial
officers in one-election judicial contests. This change is attributable not to
Amendment 80 itself but to the implementing legislation setting the general
judicial election on the party primary election date. Finally, none of the data
indicates any Amendment 80 related change in retention of incumbents.
So, which one of the following statements, if any, is most probably true
and correct in contested Arkansas trial court elections:
a) The cost of judicial elections is "skyrocketing";
b)Attorneys provide the majority of contributions to judicial cam-
paigns;
c) The incumbent enjoys a 5% to 10% edge;
d) Attorneys can't get judges elected but they can get them defeated;
e) The candidate raising the most money always wins judicial elections;
or
f) Hot glass looks like cold glass.
It is not "A." With the exception of several multi-election contests, the
cost of contested Arkansas trial court races is not "skyrocketing." Total con-
tributions are clearly increasing, but "skyrocketing" is not an accurate de-
scription of the contribution increases.
"B" is clearly not the answer. Attorneys do not provide a majority of
campaign contributions. Candidates contribute substantially more money to
judicial campaigns than do attorneys. The attorney contribution average
never exceeded 17% of the total contribution average for any of the elec-
tions included in the present study.
The candidate information available for review is not useful for prov-
ing or disproving the latter part of "D," the proposition that attorneys can get
judges defeated. The available data successfully disproves, however, the
first part of answer "D" in that attorneys clearly can get judges elected. Even
though attorneys provide only 10% to 17% of the average total contribu-
tions, the candidate enjoying an attorney contribution differential in excess
of $5000 more than his opponent wins about 90% of the time. This is a
higher average than that of the candidate having the highest total contribu-
tions with such candidates only prevailing about three out of four times. "D"
is therefore not the answer.
That leaves "C" and "F" as the choices for the answer that is "most
probably true and correct." The study information does show that incum-
bents who win have a 5.3% greater margin of victory than the winner in
open seat elections. For these incumbents, the "C" proposition is a true
statement. Two of the nineteen incumbents, however, did not win. So "C" is
only true approximately 89% of the time.
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The answer most probably true and correct is "F." Hot glass always
looks like cold glass.73 Now before you allege that you have been had,
please note that for those of you assuming "relevancy" was included in the
question remember your BAR/BRI course and the MBE. Read the question
as it is written. Find the most true and correct answer to the question as it is
written. Besides, you never know when someone is going to crank up a
Bunsen burner at a campaign fish fry.
APPENDIX




Year Last Name First Name r. Div. Year Last Name Name Cir.
Charle
2006 Barbara 2 7 2000 Halbert, Jr. s 1 1
2006 1Spruell Ray 2 7 2000 Simes, II L.T. 1 1
2006 Seagrave Alan 2 7
2000 Hill Victor 2 6
2006 Wright Randy 8N 1 2000 Thome Fred 2 6
2006 Gunter Mark 8N I
Wil-
2000 Proctor lard 6 5
11
2006 Dennis Jody W 5 2000 Thompson Morris 6 5
11
2006 Brown Wamond W 5
2000 Bradley Len 5 2
11
2006 Bynum Frank W 2 2000 Sutterfield Dennis 5 2
11
2006 Wyatt Rob W 2
2000 Boyd Jim 4 1
18
2006 Hearnsberger Marcia E 4 2000 Mashbum Mike 4 1
18
2006 Bachelor Latt E 4 2000 Watson Jeff 4 1
2004 Halbert Chuck 1 1 2000 Davis Boyce 4 2
2004 Simes, II L.T. 1 1 2000 Reynolds Ray 4 2
2000 Gunderson Steve 4 2
2004 Gibbons Iva Nell 5 2 2000 Lindsay Mark 4 2
2004 Hodges Ken 5 2 2000 Woodruff Ron 4 2
2004 McCain, Jr. Gordon 5 2 1 .
2004 Murdoch Timothy 5 2 1998 Bogard David 6 6
2004 Kennedy Jim 5 2 1998 Dishongh Allan 6 6
73. Ms. Catherine Hamilton, 10th grade Chemistry teacher, Hall High School, Little
Rock, Arkansas (1973) (stated repeatedly and to no avail based upon the repeated trips to the
school nurse with no apparent comprehension by the intended recipients).
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2004 French Teresa 10 5 1998 Langston Don 12 1
Mi-
2004 Mazzanti Joe 10 5 1998 Fitzhugh chael 12 1
2002 Kinney Baird 1 5 1998 Marschewski Jim 12 2
Mi-
2002 Murray Todd 1 5 1998 Stubblefield chael 12 2
1
2002 Fulkerson Andy 2 1 1998 Pierce Mackie 6 3
1
2002 Honeycutt Pamela 2 1 1998 Hirby Oscar 6 3
2002 Moore H.T. 2 1
1998 Mazzanti Jerry 10 2
2002 Fergus Lee 2 2 1998 Daniels Bill 10 2
2002 Hunter Ron 2 2
2002 Seagrave, III Alan 2 2 1998 Kinney Baird 1
1998 Myers, III Ralph 1
2002 Boling Larry 2 10
Charle
2002 Huckaby Curt 2 10 1998 Williams s 4 3
1998 Zimmerman Stacey 4 3
2002 Kissee Larry3 2
Mary
2002 Smith Phil 3 2 1998 Gunn Ann 4 4
1998 Bumett Jim 4 4
2002 Fox Tim 6 6
2002 Johnson J. Leon 6 6 1998 Partridge Sandra 7N 3
Gri-
1998 Phillips sham 7N 3
2002 Cazort Brad 6 7
2002 Reif Ellen 6 7 1998 Epley Alan 19E
2002 Sims Barry 6 7 1998 Crow Kent 19E
2002 Maulding Diana 6 14 1998 Cottrell Gary 21 2
Charle
2002 Smith Vann 6 14 1998 Baker s 21 2
2002 Hirby H. Oscar 6 15 1996 Simes, II L.T. 1 1
2002 Moore Richard 6 15 1996 Whitfield, Jr. Sam 1 1
2002 Hart Demaris 8S 3 1996 Watson Jeff 4 1
Tho-
2002 Johnson Kirk 8S 3 1996 Butt mas 4 1
1996 Burnett Jim 4 1
2002 French Teresa 10 3
2002 Gibson Bynum 10 3 1996 Kilgore Collins 6
1996 Hirby Oscar 6
11
2002 Henry David E l
11 1
2002 Jenkins Claude E 1 1996 Smith Vann 6 4
1
1996 Maulding Diana 6 4
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2002 Benton Bill W 3
11
2002 Bynum Wilson W 3 1996 Post Paul 12 1
11 Wil-
2002 Hall Jim W 3 1996 Smith, Jr. lard 12 1
2002 Scussel Jan W 3 1996 Saxon David 12 1
11 Nor-
2002 Williams 1 James W 3 1996 Wilkinson man 12 1
1996 O'Hern Jim 12 1
2002 Carter Christopher 14 3
2002 Putman John 14 3 1996 Anthony Carol 13 4
1996 Hall Pat 13 4
2002 Kelly Michael 14 4 -
2002 Webb Gordon 14 4 1996 Scribner Linda 19W 2
1996 Huffman Donald 19W 2
2002 McCormick David 15 2 '
Charle
2002 Mueller Brian 15 2 1996 Yeargan s 9W
1996 Alford Ed 9W
2002 Harkey Norman 16 2 _ _
2002 Rutledge Keith 16 2 1996 Whiteaker Phillip 17W 2
1996 O Bryan Joe 17W 2
2002 Tilley Bryan 16 4 _ ____-_____
2002 Weaver Tim 16 4 1996 Collier Linda 20 2
Mi-
1996 Muhy chael 20 2
2002 Fuller Carla 17 3 _ - -__
2002 Hannah Craig17 3 1996 Jones Casey 20 4
2002 Hughes Tom 17 3 1996 Williams Tim 20 4
1996 Baker Karen 20 4
Green Robin
19
2002 Scott John W 4
2002 Harper Steve 20 1
2002 Reynolds David 20 1
2002 Maggio Mike 20 2
2002 Shaw Frank 20 2
2002 Collier Linda 20 4
2002 Grinder Helen 20 4
2002 Bagby Philip 21 2
2002 Medlock Mike 21 2
